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Abstract 
The financial crisis of 2008 provides evidence for the instability of the conventional banking 
system. Social banks may present a viable alternative for conventional banks. This paper 
analyzes the performance of social banks related to the bank business model, economic 
efficiency, asset quality and stability by comparing social banks with banks where the 
difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global systemically important banks (G-
SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000-2014. We also analyze the 
relative impact of the global financial crises on the bank performance. The performance of 
social banks and G-SIBs is surprisingly similar. 
Keywords: Social banks, alternative banks, bank stability, bank efficiency, financial 
intermediation. 
*This is a revised version of the working paper  “Economic Efficiency and Profitability of Social Banks” of  the 
Foundation for European Progressive Studies. We are very grateful to audiences at the European Economics and 
Finance Society Annual Meeting 2016 in Amsterdam, at the European Conference on Banking and the 
Economy (ECOBATE) 2016 in Winchester and at the 6th Annual Conference in Political Economy, 
International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy, Leeds University 2015, and to Sushanta Mallick, Gary 
Dymski and Annina Kaltenbrunner for very helpful comments. All errors are our own. 
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1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis of 2008 has shed some light on the vulnerabilities and fragilities of 
the conventional banking system. Major banks went bankrupt in Europe as well in the US. 
There were runs on mainstream banks rarely seen since 1920s and 1930s. Bank lending 
decreased sharply (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)). The global financial system suffered a 
meltdown. Funds provided for bailouts of too-big-to-fail banks lead to the deterioration of 
public finances in Europe and the European response of fiscal consolidation and austerity 
lead to a further worsening of inequality across Europe (Kaltenbrunner, Dymski, Szymborska 
(2015)). Major factors in the evident instability of the conventional banking system are the 
increasing financialisation, liberalization and globalization of financial markets.  
Social banks may be able to provide an important alternative to conventional banks, in 
particular with respect to stability. During and after the financial crisis 2008, there was a 
potential of the banking industry to move more towards social banking. However, the 
evidence that this has happened is scarce. There is some agreement about the social banking’s 
potential in the future (for example, a potential of 15.2 million customers in Germany (ZEB 
(2012), p. 1, Berger, R.). With the experience of the financial crisis fresh in mind, some 
authors have put social banking forward as a viable alternative to conventional banking (for 
example, Benedikter (2011)). 
What are social, sometimes also called sustainable or alternative, banks? There is no 
universally agreed definition of social banks, but common themes are the focus of social 
banks on the real economy, consistent financial returns and strong capital positions (GABV 
(2014)). Social banking “focuses on achieving positive social, environmental and 
sustainability impacts; bases all its business and its operations on the achievement of positive 
social, environmental and sustainability impacts; uses financial products and services to 
achieve a blended value return.” (Weber (2014), p. 266).  Additional features of social 
banking are the rejection of the profit-maximization principle, refraining from speculation, a 
focus on the common good and the real economy and a high degree of transparency (Remer 
(2014)).1 
                                                          
1 See also Relano (2015). 
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In the European context, social banks, in one form or another, have been around for 
centuries. In the middle ages, monks founded Monti di Pieta, in essence a social bank that 
issued credit based on ethical considerations. (Milano (2011)). In Germany, savings banks 
with a social focus developed in the 19th century. Similar developments took place in France 
and the UK. See Milano (2011) 
 
2 Social Bank Performance 
In this paper we are interested in studying whether social banks are a viable alternative to 
conventional banks and whether and to what extent the performance of social banks is 
different from conventional banks. Instead of evaluating social banks’ social, sustainability, 
environmental performance and their impact on the real economy, we ask whether social 
banks are able to meet financial and economic performance criteria that are usually applied to 
conventional banks. In addition, we investigate the impact of the global financial crisis 2007-
2009 on the performance of social banks. 
We compare the performance of 78 social banks with the performance of the 30 global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board (Financial Stability 
Board (2014)) because it is very likely that the differences between social banks and the G-
SIBs is larger than for any other category of banks. Another reason of not using conventional 
banks as a comparison is that it is well known that conventional banks may try to adopt social 
banking principles (Remer (2014), p. 269) and offer social bank products, a fact that seems to 
be less likely for the G-SIBs.  
We use several standard bank performance measures (European Central Bank (2010), 
Beck et al. (2013)) that are constructed from balance sheets and income statements to 
investigate the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality and stability of social 
banks. We now discuss the performance variables and their expected signs when comparing 
social banks with the G-SIBs. 
Regarding the bank business model, we investigate whether social banks focus more on 
the conventional savings loans business. We look at three important aspects: (i) the interest 
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versus non-interest revenue, (ii) retail versus wholesale funding and (iii) the loan-deposit 
ratio. Since we would expect that social banks are more involved in the traditional savings 
loans business, we hypothesize that social banks have a significantly higher interest versus 
non-interest revenue and a higher retail versus wholesale funding ratio. Since we expect 
social banks to predominantly use their deposits to issue loans, we also expect a lower loan-
deposit ratio for social banks. In addition, due to mission of social banks, social banks may 
face restrictions in investing outside the real sector and may focus more on lending. The 
overall impact of the social banks’ business model on the loan deposit ratio may be 
ambiguous. 
 
Regarding economic efficiency, social banks may put the common good before profit-
maximization at the cost of lower profitability. Additionally, a lower reliance on speculative 
activities, a focus on traditional savings and loan products, dis-economies of scale, increased 
screening cost for social, ethical and sustainable projects may put social banks at a distinct 
disadvantage. However, given a lower degree of agency problems of social banks, monitoring 
costs may be lower. We look at two standard measures of efficiency, the cost-income ratio 
and the ratio of overheads to total assets. Due to a less pronounced profit maximization 
motive, perceived restrictions on non-real sector involvement and investment bank-like 
activities, scale dis-economies and extra screening costs for social and sustainable projects, 
we expect that social banks are less economically efficient than the G-SIBs. 
 
Regarding the asset quality, we focus on standard measures of asset quality,  (i) the loan 
loss reserves, (ii) loan loss provisions and (iii) total impaired loans, all normalized by gross 
loans. Keeping in mind that these standard asset quality measures do not take into account the 
nature of the assets, there is no clear theoretical prediction whether the asset quality offered 
by social banks is relatively better. We do not expect that the assets of social banks are of a 
higher quality than the G-SIBs. 
 
 
Regarding bank stability, economic theory does not give clear predictions for social 
banks. However, social banks may be more stable due to the lower reliance on risky, 
speculative activities. If depositors have a higher incentive to monitor in social banks, moral 
hazard and adverse selection issues may be reduced. The focus on traditional savings and 
 
 
 
5 
loan products may also be beneficial for the social banks’ stability. However, if equity 
financing predominates in social banks, stability may be negatively affected due to the 
reduced market discipline (Diamond and Rajan (2011)). We look at four standard measures 
of bank stability. First, we focus on maturity matching by looking at a liquidity ratio, namely, 
the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding that gives some indication of the 
likelihood of bank runs. Second, we look at the z-score, a measure of the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, with higher z-scores indicating a higher degree of stability or lower likelihood of 
bankruptcy. The z-score is calculated as the sum of the return on (average) assets plus the 
capital asset ratio, all divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets computed over 
the sample period and, under the normality of profits, can be shown to be equal to the inverse 
of the probability of bankruptcy. (See, for example, Beck et al. (2014), Lepetit and Strobel 
(2015)). Third, we also look separately at the return on average assets and the capital assets 
ratio, that is, the equity to total assets ratio. We do not expect that social banks are more 
stable than the G-SIBs. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there are very few statistical or econometric studies on 
social bank performance.2 This paper attempts to fill this gap. The plan of the paper is as 
follows. Section 2 describes the data set. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Data 
The data set is from the Bankscope data base of the Van Dijk Bureau. We obtain the 
consolidated accounts of the 30 banks listed in the 2014 update on the list of global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) (Financial Stability Board (2014)) between 2000 and 
2014 (15 periods). We also obtain the accounts of 25 banks that are affiliated to the Global 
Alliance for Banking on Values (gabv.org) and a further 23 banks with an emphasis on social 
and ethical goals and sustainability in their mission. The 78 social banks are checked for their 
social, ethical and sustainability-related values using their respective websites. The data set 
therefore contains 78 banks with observations over the 15 time periods 2000 to 2014. For the 
                                                          
2GABV (2014) analyses social banks in the Global Alliance for Banking on Values and their impact on the real economy, resilience, returns 
and growth using descriptive statistics.  
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social banks we use consolidated accounts if available.  The accounts are converted into US$ 
using the World Bank exchange rate at the date of the accounts. 
 
 
3 Estimation of Bank Performance and Results 
We first run two-sided t-tests for the equality of means between social and other banks, 
allowing for unequal variances social and other banks. The results are given in Table I. The 
first column displays the performance variables; the second column the number of 
observations, the third column the mean for social banks, the fourth column the mean for 
other banks and the last column displays the p-value of the test. If the p-value is smaller than 
the significance level of 1 percent, then the test rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of 
the means of the variable between social banks and other banks at the significance level of 1 
percent. Similar statements hold for the other significance levels. 
 
Table I: Two-sided t-tests of equality of means between social and other banks 
Variable Number of Observations Social Banks Other p-value 
Business Model 
   
  
Net fees and 
Commissions/Operational 
Income 
689 .1477568  .3320929 0.0000 
     
Non-deposit 
funding/Total funding 697 -80.39388 -58.68622 0.0000 
     
Loans/Customer Deposits 
(%) 692 97.36347 
 
      90.19269 
 
0.0998 
 
Economic Efficiency 
 
  
  
Cost-Income Ratio (%) 722 70.28899 64.24267 0.0003 
     
Overheads/Total Assets 723 .0384882 .0193315 0.0000 
 
Asset Quality 
 
  
  
Loan Loss 
Reserves/Gross Loans 85 .0205289 .0017973 0.0000 
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Loan Loss 
Provisions/Gross Loans 659 .010074 .0081389 
 
 
0.0497 
 
 
Total Impaired 
Loans/Gross Loans (%) 534 3.884591 2.907675 0.0010 
 
Bank Stability  
 
Liquid Assets/Deposits 
and Short term Funding 
(%) 
724 28.25614 50.09455 0.0000 
 
Z-score 720 37.46532 
 
      19.59944 
0.0000 
 
Return on Average Asset 
(%) 
722 .8565565 
.5962925 0.0008 
 
Equity/Total Assets (%) 724 8.936729 
5.70563 0.0000 
 
The results of these tests are as follows. Regarding the business model, social banks are 
more involved the conventional savings and loans business than the G-SIBs. Net fees and 
commissions over total operational income and non-deposit funding over total funding are 
significantly lower and the ratio loans to customer deposits is significantly higher for social 
banks than for the G-SIBs. 
 
Regarding economic efficiency, social banks are significantly less efficient than G-
SIBs. This can be seen from the significantly higher cost income ratio and the higher 
overheads over total assets ratio for social banks than for G-SIBs. 
 
Regarding asset quality, social banks enjoy a significantly lower asset quality than the 
G-SIBs as they have significantly higher (normalized) loan loss reserves, loan loss provisions 
and total impaired loans. 
 
Regarding bank stability, the picture is mixed. Even though the liquid assets to deposit 
and short term funding ratio is significantly lower for social banks than for the G-SIBs, 
indicating a higher risk of bank runs for social banks, the z-score, return on average asset and 
the equity to total assets ratio is significantly higher for social banks than for the G-SIBs 
which indicates that social banks are more profitable and better capitalized than the G-SIBs. 
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The two-sided t-tests of equality of means of the performance measures seem to 
indicate that social banks are more involved in the conventional savings and loans business, 
are less economically efficient, have a lower asset quality, but appear to be more stable than 
the G-SIBs. 
 
We now control for bank size, the opportunity cost of having non-earning assets, 
country (western versus non-western) and year and turn to regression analysis. In addition, 
we are interested in the relative performance of social versus G-SI banks during the financial 
crisis 2007-2009. 
 
In the regression analysis, we first run the following random effects regression 
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where  i denotes the bank and t denotes the time period, Perf is the performance of the bank 
discussed above, FAss are the fixed assets, TAss are total assets, Non-inEarAss are the non-
interest earnings, TEarAss are total earning assets, westid  is a dummy variable for a western 
bank that equals 1 if the bank has its headquarters in a Western country, socialid  is a dummy 
variable for a social bank that equals 1 for a social bank and 0 otherwise, crisistd  is a dummy 
variable for the financial crisis that equals 1 for periods 2007 to 2009 and 0 otherwise, iv is a 
bank specific heterogeneity term; and ite  is the error term with the usual properties of 
ordinary least squares error terms; and Greek letters (except the errors ite ) are coefficients to 
be estimated.  
 
In Table II we display the results of these regressions. The first column in Table I 
displays the variables that measure the performance of the bank, Perf, the second column the 
number of observations, the third column the estimate for the social bank random variable 
indicating the relative (with respect to the G-SIBs) impact of the social bank indicator on the 
performance variable, the third column the estimate for δ1 the interaction term of the dummy 
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variable for social bank and the dummy variable for the financial crisis 2007-2009, indicating 
the relative impact of the social bank-crisis indicator on the performance variable and the last 
column the overall R2. The standard error of the estimate is given in brackets immediately 
below the estimate. The notation *** (**) [*] indicates a significance level of 1 (5) [10] percent. 
 
 
 
Table II: Random Effects Regression 
Dependent Variable Observations Social Banks Social Banks*Crisis R
2overall 
Business Model 
   
  
Net fees and 
Commissions/Operational 
Income 
657 -.0215417  (.1135068)     
.0099428    
(.0657603)      0.0550                                         
     
Non-deposit 
funding/Total funding 671 
-25.59887*** 
(6.533843)        
.325587   
(.8964973)       0.1883                                         
     
Loans/Customer Deposits 
(%) 670 
-67.80685*** 
(21.31083)        
-.3570432 
(3.450691)        0.0742 
 
Economic Efficiency 
 
  
  
Cost-Income Ratio (%) 686 -8.213655  (7.491143)       
-.8355829 
(2.462122)        0.0983 
     
Overheads/Total Assets 687   -.0607224
*** 
(.0070705 )       
-.0001611 
(.0014135)        0.4105 
 
Asset Quality  
 
  
  
Loan Loss 
Reserves/Gross Loans 85 
.0090499* 
(.0047167)         
-.0040473** 
(.0019387)        0.9284                                         
     
Loan Loss 
Provisions/Gross Loans 641 
.0096738** 
(.0048625)         
.0001292 
(.0011475)         
 
0.0733 
 
 
Total Impaired 
Loans/Gross Loans (%) 
 
Bank Stability 
518 2.744528
* 
(1.440719)      
-1.364161*** 
(.5049742)        0.0420                                         
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Liquid Assets/Deposits 
and Short term Funding 
 
689 -36.03727
*** 
(13.76137)     
-4.518461 
(4.069451)        0.2682                                         
 
Z-score 
 
685 13.11544 (9.496502)         
.8157344 
(.9962115) 0.0812 
 
Return on Average Asset 
 
686 -1.388623
*** 
(.3041193)     
.0405079 
(.0839471)         0.3467                                         
Equity/Total Assets (%) 
 
689 
 
-4.195204*** 
(1.269582)     
-.13381 
(.3369841) 0.3226 
Note. The estimates for the control variables log of total assets, fixed assets/total assets, non-loan earning 
assets/total earning assets and the dummy for western country are not shown. 
 
 
The results of these random effects regressions are as follows. Regarding the bank 
business model, social banks still appear to be somewhat more involved the conventional 
savings and loans business than the G-SIBs. Non-deposit funding over total funding and, 
contrary to the tests before, the ratio loans to customer deposits is significantly lower for 
social banks than for the G-SIBs. Regarding economic efficiency, social banks are 
significantly more efficient than G-SIBs, in the case of the significantly lower overheads over 
total assets ratio. Regarding asset quality, social banks still enjoy a significantly lower asset 
quality than the G-SIBs as they have significantly higher (normalized) loan loss reserves, 
loan loss provisions and total impaired loans, but with a reduced significance level. 
 
Regarding bank stability, the picture is now changed. The result on the maturity 
matching remains the same. The liquid assets to deposit and short term funding ratio is 
significantly lower for social banks than for the G-SIBs, indicating a higher risk of bank runs 
for social banks. The z-score is now insignificantly different. In contrast to before, the return 
on average asset and the equity to total assets ratio is now significantly lower for social banks 
than for the G-SIBs which indicates that social banks are now significantly less profitable and 
significantly less capitalized than the G-SIBs. 
 
To summarize, the results of the random effects regressions seem to indicate that social 
banks are more involved in the conventional savings and loans business, are more 
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economically efficient, but now only for the overheads to total assets measure. The results on 
the asset quality remain the same, that is, social banks have lower asset quality. In contrast to 
before, social banks now have a significantly lower return on average asset and equity to total 
assets ratio.  
The results on the impact of the social bank-crisis indicator are as follows. For many 
performance variables, there is no significant difference. However, the asset quality of social 
banks, that is the normalized loan loss reserves and total impaired loans, seem to significantly 
improve relative to the G-SIBs over the global financial crises periods 2007-2009. 
 
As a robustness check, we also run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, ignoring 
bank-specific heterogeneity, but introducing country-year-fixed effects, 
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where the notation is as above and the term Country*year are the country-year fixed effects. 
 
Table III: Ordinary least squares regressions with country-time controls. 
 
Dependent Variable Observations Social Banks Social Banks*Crisis Adj. R
2 
Business Model 
   
  
Net fees and 
Commissions/Operational 
Income 
657 .0741455 (.1501204)     
-.293592** 
(.1353841)      0.1001 
     
Non-deposit 
funding/Total funding 671 
7.045682 
(4.320218)        
-1.997096 
(3.953417)       0.6159 
     
Loans/Customer Deposits 670 11.79107 (10.42916)        
10.83958 
(9.543687)        
0.6745 
 
Economic Efficiency 
 
  
  
Cost-Income Ratio (%) 686 -5.093975 (6.168323)       
-20.48047*** 
(5.668302)        
0.2134 
     
Overheads/Total Assets 687 -.0195935
*** 
(.0039984 )       
.0019198 
(.003663)        
0.8268 
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Asset Quality   
  
 
Loan Loss 
Reserves/Gross Loans 
85 .0326952
*** 
(.0055529)         
-.0195801*** 
.(0031127)        0.9808 
     
Loan Loss 
Provisions/Gross Loans 641 
.01545*** 
(.0024607)         
-.0026853 
(.0023256) 
 
0.6140 
 
 
Total Impaired 
Loans/Gross Loans (%) 
 
Bank Stability 
518 4.378838
*** 
(1.02018)      
-.3872608  
(1.117799)        0.4073 
 
Liquid Assets/Deposits 
and Short term Funding 
 
689 -39.78805
*** 
(11.57642)     
-3.923217 
(10.70561)        0.2704 
 
Z-score 
 
685 5.312103 (8.058389)         
-3.698165 
(7.390911) 0.3411 
 
Return on Average Asset 
 
722 -.1758637 (.1345257)     
.31261** 
(.1233864)         0.8293 
Equity/Total Assets (%) 
 
689 
 
-1.887798** 
(.915213)     
.9023256 
(.8463678) 0.5202 
Note. The estimates for the control variables log of total assets, fixed assets/total assets, non-loan earning 
assets/total earning assets, the dummy for western country and country-time effects are not shown. 
 
The results of the OLS regressions seem to indicate that there is now no significant 
difference regarding the business model of social banks and G-SIBs. Social banks are more 
economically efficient, again, for the overheads to total assets measure. The results on the 
asset quality remain the same, that is, social banks have lower asset quality. Regarding bank 
stability, social banks have now only a significantly lower equity to total assets ratio.  
The results on the impact of the social bank-crisis indicator for the OLS regression are similar 
than before. However, now net fees and commission over operational income and the cost 
income ratio are negatively, the return on assets is positively and normalized total impaired 
loans are insignificantly impacted by the social bank-crisis indicator. 
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4 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the performance of 78 social banks using 12 different measures related 
to the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality and stability by comparing 
social banks with banks where the difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000-
2014, using two-sided t-tests, random effects and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. 
We also analyze the relative impact of the global financial crises on the bank performance.  
Even though we do not use performance measures related to social, environmental and 
sustainability goals where social banks enjoy a comparative advantage, focusing narrowly on 
standard bank performance measures, social banks perform surprisingly well. The 
performance of social banks and the global systemically important banks is very similar.as 
we summarize below.  
Concerning the business model, there is some evidence that social banks are focused 
more on the conventional savings and loan business model, using the t-tests and the random 
effects regressions.  
Regarding the economic efficiency of social banks, there is evidence that social banks 
are relatively more economically efficient than the G-SIBs since in all regressions the 
overheads to total asset ratio is significantly lower for social banks than for the G-SIBs. 
However, cost to income ratio is insignificant in all regressions.  
Regarding asset quality, there is strong evidence that social banks enjoy a significantly 
lower asset quality in all specifications, that is, t-tests, random and OLS regressions. 
 Regarding bank stability, the measure of the likelihood of bankruptcy of social banks, 
the z-score, is insignificantly different from that of the G-SIBs in all regressions. There is 
some evidence that social banks are significantly less capitalized than G-SIBs since the 
equity to total assets ratio of social banks is significantly lower than that of the G-SIBs in all 
specifications. Similarly, there is evidence that social banks are significantly more prone to 
bank runs since the measure of maturity matching (liquid asset ratio) is significantly lower for 
social banks than for the G-SIBs in all specifications.  
Regarding social banks and the global financial crisis 2007-2009, there is strong 
evidence that asset quality of social banks as measured by normalized loan loss reserves 
 
 
 
14 
significantly improved relative to the G-SIBs over the period of the global financial crises in 
all specifications. 
Focusing on standard performance measures, we can see that social banks present a 
credible alternative to standard banks. Taking social, environmental and sustainability goals 
into account, the case for social banks is likely to be more pronounced. From an European 
perspective, there is a large potential in social banking. Although the social banking sector is 
relatively small, for example, social banks reach less than 1 % of all possible banking 
customers in Europe (Remer (2014), p. 268), social banks have experienced some success in 
increased numbers of consumers and profitability (Hayday (2014)). Many social banks are 
now associated with organizations like the European Federation of Ethical and Alternative 
Banks (FEBEA), the Global Alliance for Banking on Values (GABV) (Niven (2014)), the 
Institute for Social Banking, Institute for Social Banking (ISB) and International Association 
of Investors in the Social Economy (INAISE). It is clear that social banks have an important 
role to play in the future of the European banking industry (Dymski and Kaltenbrunner 
(2014)). 
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